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A COMMENT ON FOOHEY ET AL.,
STEERING LOAN MODIFICATIONS POSTPANDEMIC
SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB*
In their article, Steering Loan Modifications Post-Pandemic, Foohey,
Jimenez, and Odinet (“FJO”) supplement their writing last summer on the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) and
related initiatives.1 Here, FJO look to solve a brewing “crisis of modification”
and propose that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) issue a
compliance bulletin to quell this crisis.2 With this comment, I support FJO’s
proposal by digging deeper into their proposals and asking: First, what supports
regulation of modification agreements regarding defaulted consumer debt
obligations? Second, if regulation is needed, should it occur through bankruptcy
or non-bankruptcy consumer financial protection (“CFP”) regulation? Third, if
non-bankruptcy CFP regulation should supplement bankruptcy law, why should
an ability-to-repay (“ATRP”) regulatory format be preferred?
A. Why Regulate at All?
FJO think regulation of post-default modification agreements (“PDMAs”) is
justified since consumers’ vulnerabilities create incentives for advantage-taking.
Such vulnerabilities include consumers’ naivete and lack of representation; their
over-optimism as to repayment; and the shame and stigmatization as to default.
Consumer lenders and their servicers might argue that regulation is
unnecessary. First, if lenders are known to offer borrowers-in-default
modification agreements on terms less onerous than the original debt obligations,
borrowers may default strategically to seek modification (moral hazard
problems). Second, borrowers may know more than lenders about whether the
original or the modified debt obligations are affordable (asymmetries in
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1. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, The Folly of Credit as
Pandemic Relief, 68 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 126 (2020) (discussing the shortcomings of temporary
financial relief); Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, The Debt Collection Pandemic,
11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 222 (2020) (discussing the role of the COVID-19 pandemic in increasing
financial anxiety, particularly regarding debt collection); Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher
K. Odinet, CARES Act Gimmick: How Not to Give People Money During a Pandemic and What To Do
Instead, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 81 (suggesting alternatives outside of directly giving people money
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic).
2. Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez & Christopher K. Odinet, Steering Loan Modifications PostPandemic, 85 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. NO. 2, 2022, at 201.
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information). Third, context specific arguments might arise. For example,
secured lenders may argue that regulation is unnecessary given preferences for
collection over modification, especially when fully secured.
These arguments, however, pertain more to regulatory design than the need
for regulation. Moreover, current market circumstances undermine lenders’
arguments and support FJO’s call for regulation.
First, moral hazard arguments are inapt in the wake of a pandemic. What
consumer acts on predictions of future pandemic-related disaster relief? Indeed,
post-pandemic economic activity is as likely to be irrationally risk averse than
irrationally risk preferring. Second, the secured lenders FJO direct their
regulatory proposal to—used car lenders, in particular—may well prefer
modification over collection remedies, especially if the lender is not a bank (and
car loans are increasingly lent through non-bank lenders). Sweat-box lending
strategies abound here, too.3 Third, informational asymmetries are diminishing
in today’s consumer lending markets. New fintech applications offer
organizational tools to bank and credit union customers but may also provide
access to detailed information that could facilitate bespoke offers for a PDMA.
All this suggests that FJO are right to focus on post-COVID pressures for
modification of defaulted car loans, and generally on the practices of servicers
and debt buyers in the wake of the pandemic. It also suggests that incentives for
abusive PDMAs are not limited to unwinding debt moratoria imposed under the
CARES Act and other laws.
B. Why Not Simply Rely on Bankruptcy Regulation?
If regulation of PDMAs is desirable, why regulate through CFP regulation?
FJO agree their proposal may increase the number of bankruptcy filings and
express comfort with this result.4 But if bankruptcy is preferable to a “sweat-box”
PDMA, why regulate modifications outside bankruptcy law at all? Why not
regulate modifications solely through consumer bankruptcy law? Bankruptcy
regulation of PDMAs is flawed for several reasons, and not merely those set out
by FJO.
FJO argue that non-bankruptcy regulation of PDMAs is necessary because
risk-averse consumers resist bankruptcy to avoid the stigma of public
declarations of failure.5 Whether risk-averse or risk-preferring, consumerborrowers also avoid bankruptcy because: (1) it presents a blunt all-or-nothing
instrument that is too powerful when seeking relief from some but not all debtobligations; (2) it may be more expensive than consumers-in-default can afford;
3. For discussion of sweat-box lending in credit card markets, see Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy
Reform and the Sweat Box of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375.
4. See Foohey, Jiménez & Odinet, supra note 2, at 222 (“A regulatory structure that pushes people
toward bankruptcy has the potential to mitigate overall losses, while allowing those who can pay their
modified debts to do so.”).
5. Id. (“A desire to work with lenders to make good on their obligations, bankruptcy’s stigma, lack
of access to attorneys, and fears about bankruptcy’s impact on credit scores may deter people from
filing.”).
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and (3) it often does not provide the debtor with a discharge at the end of the
bankruptcy. Above-median income Chapter 7 filers may find their petition
dismissed under the means test; Chapter 13 may be easier to access but “study
after study . . . found that only about one-third of consumers who enter Chapter
13 complete their repayment plans and therefore receive a discharge of
remaining unsecured debts.”6 (4) Moreover, Chapter 13 may provide
unsatisfactory results for the above-median income debtor that completes plan
payments and succeeds in modifying debt to save a home or car.7 Under current
law, bankruptcy regulates post-default modification of consumer debts by
permitting modification in only limited instances (i.e., as set out in standards for
confirmation of a Chapter 13 debt adjustment plan) and sometimes disallowing
modification altogether. Modification of new car loans is nearly impossible in
Chapter 13 debt adjustment plans, for example.8
Because bankruptcy is an important but flawed source of regulation for
modification of defaulted consumer debt, FJO’s proposal for added nonbankruptcy regulation makes sense. Both sources of regulation have their pitfalls.
Layered regulation—belt and suspenders—is a time-honored solution to
regulatory imperfection.9
C. Why Prefer ATRP Regulation?
Non-bankruptcy CFP regulation of PDMAs could take various forms. Why
prefer regulation requiring assessment of borrowers’ abilities to repay
refinancing agreements, as FJO suggest?
Existing law mostly does not regulate PDMAs. Even if the scope of this law
were extended, it would provide only limited relief for consumer borrowers in
default.
Under the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”), for example, the
CFPB acquired regulatory jurisdiction to implement provisions of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). FDCPA regulates certain collection
practices, but not all modification of defaulted consumer debt. The CFPB could
extend regulation implementing the FDCPA to practices surrounding
modification agreements, especially deceptive practices.10 But FJO have an entire
modification industry in their crosshairs. They look to reform the substance of

6. Sara S. Greene, Parina Patel & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2017).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (precluding modification of “a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence”); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(*) (limiting
modification of certain purchase money security interests, including where the collateral consists of a
motor vehicle). Bankruptcy law could be reformed, of course. For congressional proposals for such
reform, see Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2020, S. 4991, 116th Cong. (2020).
8. See § 1325(a)(5)(*) (disallowing the bifurcation of an underwater purchase money security
interest incurred within a short time before the Chapter 13 filing).
9. So is regulatory reform. For proposals for consumer bankruptcy law reform, see Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2020, S. 4991.
10. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. 1006.18 (2021).
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PDMAs, not just whether they are procured through unfair, deceptive, or abusive
practices. Further, FJO aim to reform servicing agreements and fintech
applications, neither of which is easily described as “practices” within the scope
of FDCPA. Finally, ATRP regulation presents a novel implementation of
FDCPA potentially subject to judicial upset.
None of these potential problems exist under CFPA, however. The CFPA
covers a wider range of financial services than FDCPA, including CFPB’s
inherent jurisdiction to prohibit unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices
(what FJO might refer to as “UDAAP violations”). The market for modification
fits squarely within CFPB’s jurisdiction, which includes rulemaking authority, as
well as supervisory and enforcement jurisdiction, over all “covered persons.”
Importantly, CFPB previously brought enforcement actions alleging that certain
debt settlement practices were deceptive and abusive and thus violative of CFPA.
Service providers are on notice that subsequent enforcement actions may focus
on related practices—but which practices? Rulemaking and supervisory
memoranda (such as compliance bulletins) provide enhanced predictability to all
financial service providers in the modification market. They also ease CFPB’s
evidentiary burdens in subsequent enforcement actions.
Structuring rulemaking and supervisory assessments to require attention to
consumers’ ATRP would provide greater clarity than open-ended prohibition of
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. Unsustainable PDMAs as to which
servicers or lenders did nothing to assess borrowers’ abilities to repay are
precisely the unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices CFPB raised in earlier
enforcement actions. FJO’s proposed compliance bulletin would clarify
regulators’ specific concerns.
Promulgation of ATRP regulation sits squarely within CFPB’s competence.
CFPA and other federal legislation within CFPB’s jurisdiction already contain
examples of ATRP regulation related to residential mortgages11 and credit card
credit.12 The CFPB possesses rulemaking authority under these statutory
provisions. It also sought to constrain small-dollar, short-term consumer loans,
such as pay-day loans, through ATRP regulation. Although this aspect of CFPB
pay-day regulation was revised in 2020 during the Trump Administration, these
revisions were not premised on a claim that the CFPB lacked authority to
promulgate ATRP regulations but rather only on policy grounds.13
****

11. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title XIV—Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2136 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) (observe also its implementation through Reg QM).
12. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 111 Pub. L. No. 24,
123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (observe also its implementation
through revisions to Reg Z).
13. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44382 (2020)
(“The Bureau is making these changes to the regulations based on a re-evaluation of the legal and
evidentiary bases for these provisions.”).
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FJO’s idea for a bulletin is both substantive and procedural. Substantively, it
would presume unsustainable PDMAs to violate CFPA and, thus, fair game for
CFPB enforcement actions. Procedurally, it would fall short of full rulemaking
but may facilitate future rulemaking. The CFPB should follow FJO’s substantive
and procedural advice.

